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Abstract. Probabilistic programs are key to deal with uncertainty in
e.g. controller synthesis. They are typically small but intricate. Their
development is complex and error prone requiring quantitative reason-
ing over a myriad of alternative designs. To mitigate this complexity,
we adopt counterexample-guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS) to auto-
matically synthesise finite-state probabilistic programs. Our approach
leverages efficient model checking, modern SMT solving, and counterex-
ample generation at program level. Experiments on practically relevant
case studies show that design spaces with millions of candidate designs
can be fully explored using a few thousand verification queries.
1 Introduction
With the ever tighter integration of computing systems with their environment,
quantifying (and minimising) the probability of encountering an anomaly or un-
expected behaviour becomes crucial. This insight has led to a growing interest
in probabilistic programs and models in the software engineering community.
Henzinger [43] for instance argues that “the Boolean partition of software into
correct and incorrect programs falls short of the practical need to assess the
behaviour of software in a more nuanced fashion [. . .].” In [61], Rosenblum ad-
vocates taking a more probabilistic approach in software engineering. Concrete
examples include quantitative analysis of software product lines [32,40,60,67,68],
synthesis of probabilities for adaptive software [19, 23], and probabilistic model
checking at runtime to support verifying dynamic reconfigurations [20, 37].
Synthesis of probabilistic programs. The development of systems under uncer-
tainty is intricate. Probabilistic programs are a prominent formalism to deal
with uncertainty. Unfortunately, such programs are rather intricate. Their de-
velopment is complex and error prone requiring quantitative reasoning over
many alternative designs. One remedy is the exploitation of probabilistic model
checking [6] using a Markov chain as the operational model of a program. One
may then apply model checking on each design, or some suitable representation
⋆ This work has been supported by the DFG RTG 2236 “UnRAVeL”, the ERC Ad-
vanced Grant 787914 “FRAPPANT”.
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thereof [27,32]. Techniques such as parameter synthesis [26,42,58] and model re-
pair [9,31] have been successful, but they only allow to amend or infer transition
probabilities, whereas the control structure—the topology of the probabilistic
model—is fixed.
Counter-Example-Guided Inductive Synthesis. This paper aims to overcome the
existing limitation, by adopting the paradigm of CounterExample-Guided Induc-
tive Synthesis (CEGIS, cf. Fig. 1) [1,3,64,65] to finite-state probabilistic models
and programs. Program synthesis amounts to automatically provide an instanti-
ated probabilistic program satisfying all properties, or returns that such realisa-
tion is non-existing. This syntax-based approach starts with a sketch, a program
with holes, and iteratively searches for good—or even optimal—realisations, i.e.,
instantiated programs. Rather than checking all realisations, the design space is
pruned by potentially ruling out many realisations (dashed area) at once. From
every realisation that was verified and rejected, a counterexample (CE) is derived,
e.g., a program run violating the specification.
Synth Verifier
instance
reject +
CE
sketch properties
unsatisfiable
no instance
synthesised program
accept
Fig. 1. CEGIS for synthesis.
An SMT (satisfiability modulo theory)-
based synthesiser uses the CE to prune pro-
grams that also violate the specification.
These programs are safely removed from the
design space. The synthesis and verification
step are repeated until either a satisfying pro-
gram is found or the entire design space is
pruned implying the non-existence of such a
program.
Problem statement and program-level approach. This paper tailors and gener-
alises CEGIS to probabilistic models and programs. The input is a sketch—a
probabilistic program with holes, where each hole can be replaced by finitely
many options—, a set of quantitative properties that the program needs to ful-
fil, and a budget. All possible realisations have a certain cost and the synthesis
provides a realisation that fits within the budget. Programs are represented
in the PRISM modelling language [50] and properties are expressed in PCTL
(Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic) extended with rewards, as standard in
probabilistic model checking [34, 50]. Program sketches succinctly describe the
design space of the system by providing the program-level structure but leaving
some parts (e.g., command guards or variable assignments) unspecified.
Outcomes. To summarise, this paper presents a novel synthesis framework for
probabilistic programs that adhere to a given set of quantitative requirements
and a given budget. We use families of Markov chains to formalise our problem,
and then formulate a CEGIS-style algorithm on these families. Here, CEs are
subgraphs of the Markov chains. In the second part, we then generalise the
approach to reason on probabilistic programs with holes. While similar in spirit,
we rely on program-level CEs [33, 71], and allow for a more flexible sketching
language. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first lifting of CEGIS to
probabilistic programs. The CEGIS approach is sound and complete: either an
admissible program does exist and it is computed, or no such program exists
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and the algorithm reports this. We provide a prototype implementation build
on top of the model checker Storm [34] and the SMT-tool Z3 [56]. Experiments
with different examples demonstrate scalability: design spaces with millions of
realisations can be fully explored by a few thousand verification queries and
result in a speedup of orders of magnitude.
Related work.We build on the significant body of research that employs formal
methods to analyse quality attributes of alternative designs, e.g. [8,10,16,38,66,
72]. Enumerative approaches based on Petri nets [54], stochastic models [19,62]
and timed automata [44, 52], and the corresponding tools for simulation and
verification (e.g. Palladio [10], PRISM [50], UPPAAL [44]) have long been used.
For non-probabilistic systems, CEGIS can find programs for a variety of
challenging problems [63, 64]. Meta-sketches and the optimal and quantitative
synthesis problem in a non-probabilistic setting have been proposed [17, 25, 30].
A prominent representation of sets of alternative designs are modal transi-
tion systems [5, 49, 53]. In particular, parametric modal transition systems [11]
and synthesis therein [12] allow for similar dependencies that occur in program-
level sketches. Probabilistic extensions are considered in, e.g. [35], but not in
conjunction with synthesis. Recently [36] proposed to exploit relationships be-
tween model and specification, thereby reducing the number of model-checking
instances.
In the domain of quantitative reasoning, sketches and likelihood computa-
tion are used to find probabilistic programs that best match available data [57].
The work closest to our approach synthesises probabilistic systems from specifi-
cations and parametric templates [39]. The principal difference to our approach
is the use of counterexamples. The authors leverage evolutionary optimisation
techniques without pruning. Therefore, the completeness is only achieved by
exploring all designs, which is practically infeasible. An extension to handle pa-
rameters affecting transition probabilities (rates) has been integrated into the
evolutionary-driven synthesis [21, 23] and is available in RODES [22]. Some pa-
pers have considered the analysis of sets of alternative designs within the quan-
titative verification of software product lines [40,60,68]. The typical approach is
to analyse all individual designs (product configurations) or build and analyse
a single (so-called all-in-one) Markov decision process describing all the designs
simultaneously. Even with symbolic methods, this hardly scales to large sets
of alternative designs. These techniques have recently been integrated into Pro-
Feat [32] and QFLan [67]. An abstraction-refinement scheme has recently been
explored in [27]. It iteratively analyses an abstraction of a (sub)set of designs—
it is an orthogonal and slightly restricted approach to the inductive method
presented here (detailed differences are discussed later). An incomplete method
in [45] employs abstraction targeting a particular case study. SMT-based en-
codings for synthesis in Markov models have been used in, e.g. [24, 46]. These
encodings are typically monolithic—they do not prune the search space via CEs.
Probabilistic CEs have been recently used to ensure that controllers obtained via
learning from positive examples meet given safety properties [74]. In contrast,
we leverage program-level CEs that can be used to prune the design space.
3
2 Preliminaries and Problem Statement
We start with basics of probabilistic model checking, for details, see [6, 7], and
then formalise families of Markov chains. Finally, we define some synthesis prob-
lems.
Probabilistic models and specifications. A probability distribution over a
finite set X is a function µ : X → [0, 1] with
∑
x∈X µ(X) = 1. Let Distr(X)
denote the set of all distributions on X .
Definition 1 (MC). A discrete-time Markov chain (MC) D is a tuple (S, s0, P )
with finite set S of states, initial state s0 ∈ S, and transition probabilities P : S →
Distr(S). We write P (s, t) to denote P (s)(t).
For S′ ⊆ S, the set Succ(S′) := {t ∈ S | ∃s ∈ S′. P (s, t) > 0} denotes the succes-
sor states of S′. A path of an MC D is an (in)finite sequence pi = s0s1s2, where
si ∈ S, and si+1 ∈ Succ(si) for all i ∈ N.
Definition 2 (sub-MC). Let MC D = (S, s0, P ) and critical states C ⊆ S
with s0 ∈ C. The sub-MC of D,C is the MC D↓C = (C ∪ Succ(C), s0, P
′) with
P ′(s, t) = P (s, t) for s ∈ C, P ′(s, s) = 1 for s ∈ Succ(C)\C, and P ′(s, t) = 0
Specifications. For simplicity, we focus on reachability properties ϕ = P∼λ(♦G)
for a set G ⊆ S of goal states, threshold λ ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R, and comparison re-
lation ∼ ∈ {<,≤,≥, >}. The interpretation of ϕ on MC D is as follows. Let
Prob(D,♦G) denote the probability to reach G from D’s initial state. Then,
D |= ϕ if Prob(D,♦G) ∼ λ. A specification is a set Φ = {ϕi}i∈I of properties,
and D |= Φ if ∀i ∈ I. D |= ϕi. Upper-bounded properties (with ∼ ∈ {<,≤}) are
safety properties, lower-bounded properties are liveness properties. Extensions
to expected rewards or ω-regular properties are rather straightforward.
Families of Markov chains. We recap an explicit representation of a family
of MCs using a parametric transition function, as in [27].
Definition 3 (Family of MCs). A family of MCs is a tuple D = (S, s0,K,P)
with S, s0 as before, a finite set of parameters K where the domain for each pa-
rameter k ∈ K is Tk ⊆ S, and transition probability function P : S → Distr(K).
The transition probability function of MCs maps states to distributions over
successor states. For families, this function maps states to distributions over
parameters. Instantiating each parameter with a value from its domain yields a
“concrete” MC, called a realisation.
Definition 4 (Realisation). A realisation of a family D = (S, s0,K,P) is a
function r : K → S where ∀k ∈ K : r(k) ∈ Tk. A realisation r yields an MC
Dr := (S, s0,P(r)), where P(r) is the transition probability matrix in which
each k ∈ K in P is replaced by r(k). Let RD denote the set of all realisations
for D.
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(a) Dr1 with r1(k2) = 2, r1(k3) = 2
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(b) Dr2 with r2(k2) = 2, r2(k3) = 4
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(c) Dr3 with r3(k2) = 3, r3(k3) = 2
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(d) Dr4 with r4(k2) = 3, r4(k3) = 4
Fig. 2. The four different realisations of family D.
As a family D has finite parameter domains, the number of family members (i.e.
realisations from RD) of D is finite, but exponential in |K|. While all MCs share
their state space, their reachable states may differ.
Example 1. Consider the family of MCs D = (S, s0,K,P) where S = {0, . . . , 4},
s0 = 0, and K = {k0, . . . , k5} with Tk0 = {0}, Tk1 = {1}, Tk2 = {2, 3}, Tk3 =
{2, 4}, Tk4 = {3} and Tk5 = {4}, and P given by:
P(0) = 0.5: k1 + 0.5: k2 P(1) = 0.1: k0 + 0.8: k3 + 0.1: k5 P(2) = 1: k3
P(3) = 1: k4 P(4) = 1: k5
Fig. 2 shows the four MCs of D. Unreachable states are greyed out.
The function c : RD → N assigns realisation costs. Attaching costs to realisations
is a natural way to distinguish preferable realisations. We stress the difference
with rewards in MCs; the latter impose a cost structure on paths in MCs.
Problem statement Synthesis problems. Let D be a family, and Φ be a set of
properties, and B ∈ N a budget. Consider the synthesis problems:
1. Feasibility synthesis: Find a realisation r ∈ RD with Dr |= Φ and c(r) ≤ B.
2. Max synthesis: For given G ⊆ S, find r∗ ∈ RD with
r∗ := argmax
r∈RD
{Prob(Dr,♦G) | Dr |= Φ and c(r) ≤ B}.
The problem in feasibility synthesis is to determine a realisation satisfying all
ϕ ∈ Φ, or return that no such realisation exists. This problem is NP-complete [27].
The problem in max synthesis is to find a realisation that maximises the reach-
ability probability of reaching G. It can analogously be defined for minimising
such probabilities. As families are finite, such optimal realisations r∗ always ex-
ist. It is beneficial to consider a variant of the max-synthesis problem in which
the realisation r∗ is not required to achieve the maximal reachability proba-
bility, but it suffices to be close to it. This notion of ε-maximal synthesis for
a given 0 < ε ≤ 1 amounts to find a realisation r∗ with Prob(Dr∗ ,♦G) ≥
(1−ε) · max
r∈RD
{Prob(Dr, φ)}.
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Problem statement and structure. In this paper, we propose novel synthesis algo-
rithms for the probabilistic systems that are based on two concepts, CEGIS [64]
and syntax-guided synthesis [3]. To simplify the presentation, we start with
CEGIS in Sect. 3 and adopt it for MCs and the feasibility problem. In Sect. 4,
we lift and tune CEGIS, in particular towards probabilistic program sketches.
3 CEGIS for Markov Chain Families
We follow the typical separation of concerns as in oracle-guided inductive syn-
thesis [4, 39, 41]: a synthesiser selects single realisations r that have not been
considered before, and a verifier checks whether the MC Dr satisfies the spec-
ification Φ (cf. Fig. 1 on page 1). If a realisation violates the specification, the
verifier returns a conflict representing the core part of the MC causing the vio-
lation.
3.1 Conflicts and synthesiser
To formalise conflicts, a partial realisation of a family D is a function r¯ : K →
S ∪ {⊥} such that ∀k ∈ K. r¯(k) ∈ Tk ∪ {⊥}. For any partial realisations r¯1, r¯2,
let r¯1 ⊆ r¯2 iff r¯1(k) ∈ {r¯2(k),⊥} for all k ∈ K.
Definition 5 (Conflict). Let r ∈ RD be a realisation with Dr 6|= ϕ for ϕ ∈ Φ.
A partial realisation r¯ϕ ⊆ r is a conflict for the property ϕ iff Dr′ 6|= ϕ for each
realisation r′ ⊇ r¯ϕ. A set of conflicts is called a conflict set.
To explore all realisations, the synthesiser starts with Q := RD and picks some
realisation r ∈ Q.3 Either Dr |= Φ and we immediately return r, or a conflict is
found: then Q is pruned by removing all conflicts that the verifier found. If Q is
empty, we are done: each realisation violates a property ϕ ∈ Φ.
3.2 Verifier
Definition 6. A verifier is sound and complete, if for family D, realisation r,
and specification Φ, the verifier terminates, the returned conflict set is empty iff
Dr |= Φ, and if it is not empty, it contains a conflict r¯ϕ ⊆ r for some ϕ ∈ Φ.
Algorithm 1 outlines a basic verifier. It uses an off-the-shelf probabilistic model-
checking procedure Check(Dr, ϕ) to determine which ϕ ∈ Φ (if any) are vio-
lated. The algorithm then iterates over the violated ϕ and computes critical sets
C of Dr that induce sub-MCs such that Dr ↓C 6|= ϕ (line 6). The critical sets for
safety properties can be obtained via standard methods [2], support for liveness
properties is discussed at the end of the section.
3 We focus on program-level synthesis, and refrain from discussing important imple-
mentation aspects—like how to represent Q—here.
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Fig. 3. Fragment and corresponding sub-MC that suffices to refute Φ
Algorithm 1 Verifier
1: function Verify(family D, realisation r, specification Φ)
2: Violated← ∅; Conflict← ∅; Dr ← GenerateMC(D, r);
3: for all ϕ ∈ Φ do
4: if not Check(Dr, ϕ) then Violated← Violated ∪ {ϕ}
5: for all ϕ ∈ Violated do
6: Cϕ ← ComputeCriticalSet(Dr, ϕ)
7: Conflict← Conflict ∪ generateConflict(D, r,Cϕ)
8: return Conflict
Example 2. ReconsiderD from Ex. 1 with Φ := {ϕ := P≤2/5(♦{2})}. Assume the
synthesiser picks realisation r1. The verifier builds Dr1 and determines Dr1 6|= Φ.
Observe that the verifier does not need the full realisationDr1 to refute Φ. In fact,
the paths in the fragment of Dr1 in Fig. 3a (ignoring the outgoing transitions
of states 1 and 2) suffice to show that the probability to reach state 2 exceeds
2/5. Formally, the fragment in Fig. 3b is a sub-MC Dr1 ↓C with critical states
C = {0}. The essential property is [70]:
If a sub-MC of a MC D refutes a safety property ϕ, then D refutes ϕ too.
Observe that Dr1 ↓ C is part of Dr2 too. Formally, the sub-MC of Dr2 ↓ C is
isomorphic to Dr1 ↓C and therefore also violates Φ. Thus, Dr2 6|= Φ.
Finally, the verifier translates the obtained critical set C for realisation r to a
conflict Conflict(C, r) ⊆ r and stores it in the conflict set Conflict (line 7). The
procedure generateConflict(D, r, C) identifies the subset of parameters K
that occur in the sub-MCs Dr ↓ C and returns the corresponding partial real-
isation. The proposition below clarifies the relation between critical sets and
conflicts.
Proposition 1. If C is a critical set for Dr and ϕ, then C is also a critical set
for each Dr′ , r
′ ⊇ Conflict(C, r), and Dr′ 6|= ϕ.
Example 3. Recall from Ex. 2 that Dr2 6|= Φ. This can be concluded without
constructing Dr2 . Just considering r2, D and C suffices: First, take all parameters
occurring in P(c) for any c ∈ C. This yields {k1, k2}. The partial realisation
r¯ := {k1 7→ 1, k2 7→ 2} is a conflict. The values for the other parameters do not
affect the shape of the sub-MC induced by C. Realisation r2 ⊃ r¯ only varies
from r1 in the value of k3, but r¯(k3) = ⊥, i.e., k3 is not included in the conflict.
This suffices to conclude Dr2 6|= Φ.
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Conflicts for liveness properties. To support liveness properties such as ϕ :=
P>λ(♦G), we first consider a (standard) dual safety property ϕ
′ := P<1−λ(♦B),
where B is the set of all states that do not have a path to G. Observe that B can
be efficiently computed using graph algorithms. We have to be careful, however.
Example 4. Consider Dr1 , and let ϕ := P>0.6(♦{4}). Dr1 6|= ϕ. Then, ϕ
′ =
P<0.4(♦{2}), which is refuted with critical set C = {0} as before. Although
Dr2 ↓C is again isomorphic to Dr1 ↓C, we have Dr2 |= ϕ. The problem here is
that state 2 is in B for Dr1 as r1(k3) = 2, but not in B for Dr2 , as r2(k3) = 4.
To prevent the problem above, we ensure that the states in B cannot reach G in
other realisations, by including B in the critical set of ϕ: Let C be the critical set
for the dual safety property ϕ′. We define B∪C as critical states for ϕ. Together,
we reach states B with a critical probability mass4, and never leave B.
Example 5. In Dr1 , we compute critical states {0, 2}, preventing the erroneous
reasoning from the previous example. For Dr4 , we compute C
′ = {0} ∪ {3} as
critical states, and as Dr4 ↓C
′ is isomorphic to Dr3 ↓C
′, we obtain that Dr3 6|= ϕ.
4 Syntax-Guided Synthesis for Probabilistic Programs
Probabilistic models are typically specified by means of a program-level mod-
elling language, such as PRISM [50], PIOA [73], JANI [18], or MODEST [15].
We propose a sketching language based on the PRISM modelling language. A
sketch, a syntactic template, defines a high-level structure of the model and rep-
resents a-priori knowledge about the system under development. It effectively
restricts the size of the design space and also allows to concisely add constraints
and costs to its members. The proposed language is easily supported by model
checkers and in particular by methods for generating CEs [33, 71]. Below, we
describe the language, and adapt CEGIS from state level to program level. In
particular, we employ so-called program-level CEs, rather than CEs on the state
level.
4.1 A program sketching language
Let us briefly recap how the model-based concepts translate to language concepts
in the PRISM guarded-command language. A PRISM program consists of one
or more reactive modules that may interact with each other. Consider a single
module. This is not a restriction, every PRISM program can be flattened into
this form. A module has a set of bounded variables spanning its state space.
Transitions between states are described by guarded commands of the form:
guard → p1 : update1 + . . . . . .+ pn : updaten
4 A good implementation takes a subset of B′ ⊆ B by considering the Prob(D,♦B′).
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hole X either { XA is 1 cost 3, 2}
hole Y either { YA is 1, 3 }
hole Z either { 1, 2 }
constraint !(XA && YA);
module rex
s : [0 ..3] init 0;
s = 0 -> 0.5: s’=X + 0.5: s’=Y;
s = 1 -> s’=s+Z;
s >= 2 -> s’=s;
endmodule
(a) Program sketch SH
module rex
s : [0..3] init 0;
s = 0 -> 0 .5: s’=1 + 0.5: s’=3;
s = 1 -> s’=3;
s >= 2 -> s’=s;
endmodule
(b) Instance SH({X 7→1, Z 7→2, Y 7→3})
Fig. 4. Running example
The guard is a Boolean expression over the module’s variables of the model. If the
guard evaluates to true, the module can evolve into a successor state by updating
its variables. An update is chosen according to the probability distribution given
by expressions p1, . . . , pn. In every state enabling the guard, the evaluation of
p1, . . . , pn must sum up to one. Overlapping guards yield non-determinism and
are disallowed here. Roughly, a program P thus is a tuple (Var, E) of variables
and commands. For a program P, the underlying MC [[P ]] are P’s semantics.
We lift specifications: Program P satisfies a specification Φ, iff [[P ]] |= Φ, etc.
A sketch is a program that contains holes. Holes are the program’s open parts
and can be replaced by one of finitely many options. Each option can optionally
be named and associated with a cost. They are declared as:
hole h either { x1 is expr1 cost c1, . . . , xk is exprk cost ck }
where h is the hole identifier, xi is the option name, expri is an expression over
the program variables describing the option, and ci are the cost, given as ex-
pressions over natural numbers. A hole h can be used in commands in a similar
way as a constant, and may occur multiple times within multiple commands,
in both guards and updates. The option names can be used to describe con-
straints on realisations. These propositional formulae over option names restrict
realisations, e.g.,
constraint (x1 ∨ x2) =⇒ x3
requires that whenever the options x1 or x2 are taken for some (potentially
different) holes, option x3 is also to be taken.
Definition 7 (Program sketch). A (PRISM program) sketch is a pair SH :=
(PH ,OptionH , Γ, cost) where PH is a program with a set H of holes with options
OptionH , Γ are constraints over OptionH , and cost : OptionH → N option-costs.
Example 6. We consider a small running example to illustrate the main concepts.
Fig. 4a depicts the program sketch SH with holes H = {X,Y,Z}. For X, the
options are OptionX = {1, 2}. The constraint forbids XA and XB both being one;
it ensures a non-trivial random choice in state s=0.
Remark 1. Below, we formalise notions previously used on families. Due to flexi-
bility of sketching (in particular in combination with multiple modules), it is not
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Algorithm 2 Synthesiser (feasibility synthesis)
1: function Synthesis(program sketch SH , specification Φ, budget B)
2: ψ ← Initialise(SH, B)
3: R← GetRealisation(ψ)
4: while R 6= Unsat do
5: C ← Verify(SH(R), Φ)
6: if C = ∅ then return R
7: ψ ← ψ ∧
(∧
R¯∈C
LearnFromConflict(SH , R¯)
)
8: R← GetRealisation(ψ)
9: return Unsat
straightforward to provide family semantics to sketches, but the concepts are
analogous. In particular: holes and parameters are similar, parameter domains
are options, and family realisations and sketch realisations both yield concrete
instances from a family/sketch. The synthesis problems carry over naturally.
Definition 8 (Realisations of sketches). Let SH := (PH ,OptionH , Γ, cost)
be a sketch, a sketch realisation on holes H is a function R : H → OptionH
with ∀h ∈ H. R(h) ∈ Optionh and that satisfies all constraints in Γ . The sketch
instance SH(R) for realisation R is the program (without holes) PH [H/R] in
which each hole h ∈ H in PH is replaced by R(h). The cost c(R) is the sum of
the cost of the selected options, c(R) :=
∑
h∈H cost(R(h)).
Example 7. We continue Ex. 6. The program in Fig. 4b reflects SH(R) for re-
alisation R = {X 7→1, Z 7→2, Y 7→3}, with c(R) = 3 as cost(R(X)) = 3 and all
other options have cost zero. For realisation R′ = {Y, Z 7→ 1, X 7→ 2}, c(R′) = 0.
The assignment {X,Y, Z 7→ 1} violates the constraint and is not a realisation.
In total, SH represents 6 = 2
3−2 programs and their underlying MCs.
4.2 A program-level synthesiser
Feasibility synthesis. The synthesiser follows the steps in Alg. 2. During the
synthesis process, the synthesiser stores and queries the set of realisations not yet
pruned. These remaining realisations are represented by (the satisfying assign-
ments of) the first-order formula ψ over hole-assignments. Iteratively extending
ψ with conjunctions thus prunes the remaining design space.
We give a brief overview, before detailing the steps. Initialise(SH , B) con-
structs ψ such that it represents all sketch realisations that satisfy the constraints
in the sketch SH within the budget B. GetRealisation(ψ) exploits an SMT-
solver for linear (bounded) integer arithmetic to obtain a realisation R consistent
with ψ, or Unsat if no such realisation exists. As long as new realisations are
found, the verifier analyses them (line 5) and returns a conflict set C. If C = ∅,
the SH(R) satisfies the specification Φ and the search is terminated. Otherwise,
the synthesiser updates ψ based on the conflicts (line 7). R is always pruned.
Initialise(SH , B): Let hole h ∈ H have (ordered) optionsOptionh = {o
1
h, . . . , o
n
h}.
To encode realisation R, we introduce integer-valued meta-variablesKH := {κh |
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h ∈ H} with the semantics that κh = i whenever hole h has value o
i
h, i.e.,
R(h) = oih. We set ψ := ψopti ∧ψΓ ∧ψcost, where ψopti ensures that each hole is
assigned to some option, ψΓ ensures that the sketch’s constraints Γ are satisfied,
and ψcost ensures that the budget is respected. These sub-formulae are:
ψopti :=
∧
h∈H
1 ≤ κh ≤ |Optionh|, ψΓ :=
∧
γ∈Γ
γ[N ih/κh = i],
ψcost :=
∑
h∈H
ωh ≤ B ∧
( ∧
h∈H
n∧
i=1
κh = i→ ωh = cost(o
i
h)
)
,
where γ[N ih/κh = i] denotes that in every constraint γ ∈ Γ we replace each
option name N ih for an option o
i
h with κh = i, and ωh are fresh variables storing
the cost for the selected option at hole h.
Example 8. For sketch SH in Fig. 4a, we obtain (with slight simplifications)
ψ := 1 ≤ κX ≤ 2 ∧ 1 ≤ κY ≤ 2 ∧ 1 ≤ κZ ≤ 2 ∧ ¬(κX = 1 ∧ κY = 1)∧
ωX + ωY + ωZ ≤ B ∧ κX = 1→ ωX = 3 ∧ κX = 2→ ωX = 0 ∧ ωY = 0 ∧ ωZ = 0.
GetRealisation(ψ): To obtain a realisation R, we check satisfiability of ψ.
The solver either returns Unsat indicating that the synthesiser is finished, or
Sat, together with a satisfying assignment αR : KH → N. The assignment αR
uniquely identifies a realisation R by R(h) := o
αR(κh)
h . The sum over ω∗ gives
c(R).
Verify(SH(r), Φ): invokes any sound and complete verifier, e.g., an adaption
of the verifier from Sect. 3.2 as presented in Sect. 4.3.
LearnFromConflict(SH , R¯): For a conflict
5 R¯ ∈ C, we add the formula
¬
( ∧
h∈H,R¯(h) 6=⊥
κh = αR¯(κh)
)
.
that excludes realisations R′ ⊇ R¯. Intuitively, the formula states that the real-
isations remaining in the design space (encoded by the updated ψ) must have
different valuations of holes h w.r.t. R¯ (for holes where R¯(h) 6= ⊥).
Example 9. Consider ψ from Ex. 8. The satisfying assignment (for B ≥ 2) is
{κX 7→ 1, κY , κZ 7→ 2, ωX 7→ 3, ωY , ωZ 7→ 0} represents R, c(R) = 3 from Ex. 6.
Consider Φ = {P≤0.4[♦ s=3]}. The verifier (for now, magically) constructs a
conflict set {R¯} with R¯ = {Y 7→ 3}. The synthesiser updates ψ ← ψ ∧ κY 6= 2
(recall that κY = 2 encodes Y 7→ 3). A satisfying assignment {κX , κY , κZ 7→ 1}
for ψ encodes R′ from Ex. 7. As SH(R
′) |= Φ, the verifier reports no conflict.
Optimal synthesis. We adapt the synthesiser to support max synthesis, cf.
Alg. 3. Recall the problem aims at maximizing the probability of reaching states
5 As in Sect. 3.1: A partial realisation for SH is a function R¯ : H → OptionH ∪ {⊥}
s.t. ∀h ∈ H. R¯(h) ∈ Optionh ∪ {⊥}. For partial realisations R¯1, R¯2, let R¯1 ⊆ R¯2
iff ∀h ∈ H. R¯1(h) ∈ {R¯2(h),⊥}. Let R be a realisation s.t. SH(R) 6|= ϕ for ϕ ∈ Φ.
Partial realisation R¯ϕ ⊆ R is a conflict for ϕ iff ∀R
′ ⊇ R¯ϕ SH(R
′) 6|= ϕ.
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Algorithm 3 Synthesiser (max synthesis)
1: function Synthesis(SH, Φ, B, goal predicate G, tolerance ε)
2: λ∗ ←∞, R∗ ← Unsat, ψ ← Initialise(SH, B)
3: R← getRealisation(ψ)
4: while R 6= Unsat do
5: C, λnew ← OptimiseVerify(SH(R), Φ,G, λ
∗, ε)
6: if C = ∅ then λ∗, R∗ ← λnew, R
7: ψ ← ψ ∧
(∧
R¯∈C
LearnFromConflict(SH , R¯)
)
8: R← getRealisation(ψ)
9: return R∗
const int X = 1, Y = 3;
...
module rex
s : [0..3] init 0;
s=0 -> 0.5: s’=X + 0.5: s’=Y;
endmodule
(a) CE for upper bound
...
module rex
s : [0..3] init 0;
s=0 -> 0.5:s’=X + 0.5:s’=Y;
s=3 -> s’=3
endmodule
(b) CE for lower bound
Fig. 5. CEs for (a) P≤0.4[F s=3] and (b) P>0.6[F s=2].
described by a predicate G, w.r.t. the tolerance ε ∈ (0, 1). Algorithm 3 stores in
λ∗ the maximal probability Prob(SH(R),♦G) among all considered realisations
R, and this R in R∗. In each iteration, an optimising verifier is invoked (line 5)
on realisation R. If SH(R) |= Φ and Prob(SH(R),♦G) > λ
∗, it returns an empty
conflict set and λnew := Prob(SH(R),♦G). Otherwise, it reports a conflict set
for Φ ∪ {P≥(1−ε)·λ∗(♦G)}.
4.3 A program-level verifier
We now adapt the statel-level verifier from Sect. 3.2 in Alg. 1 to use program-
level counterexamples [71] for generating conflicts. The appendix contains more
details.
generateMC(SH , R): This procedure first constructs the instance SH(R), i.e.,
a program without holes, from SH and R, as in Fig. 4b: Constraints in the
sketch are removed, as they are handled by the synthesiser. This approach allows
us to use any model checker supporting PRISM programs. The realisation is
passed separately, the sketch is parsed once and then appropriately instantiated.
The instance is then translated into the underlying MC [[SH(R) ]] via standard
procedures, with transitions annotated with their generating commands.
ComputeCriticalSet(D,ϕ) computes program-level CEs as analogue of criti-
cal sets. They are defined on commands rather than on states. Let P = (Var, E)
be a program with commands E. Let P|E′ := (Var, E
′) denote the restriction of
P to E′ (with variables and initial sates as in P). Building P|E′ may introduce
deadlocks in [[P|E′ ]] (just like a critical set introduces deadlocks). To remedy this,
we use the standard operation fixdl, which takes a program and adds commands
that introduce self-loops for states without enabled guard.
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Definition 9. For program P = (Var, E) and specification Φ with P 6|= Φ,
a program-level CE E′ ⊆ E is a set of commands, such that for all (non-
overlapping) programs P ′ = (Var, E′′) with E′′ ⊇ E′ (i.e, extending P), fixdl(P ′) 6|=
Φ.
Example 10. Reconsider Φ = {P≤0.4[♦ s=3]}. Figure 5a shows a CE for SH(R)
in Fig. 4b. The probability to reach s=3 in the underlying MC is 0.5 > 0.4.
For safety properties, program-level CEs coincide with high-level CEs proposed
in [71], their extension to liveness properties follows the ideas on families. The
program-level CEs are computed by an extension of the MaxSat [14] approach
from [33]. The appendix contains details and further extensions.
GenerateConflict(SH , R,E) generates conflicts from commands: we map
commands in SH(R)|E to the commands from SH , i.e., we restore the informa-
tion about the critical holes corresponding to the part of the design space that
can be pruned by CE E. Formally, Conflict(E,R)(h) = R(h) for all h ∈ H that
appear in restriction SH |E .
Proposition 2. If E is a CE for SH(R), then E is also a CE for each SH(R
′),
R′ ⊇ Conflict(E,R).
Example 11. The CEs in Fig. 5a contain commands which depend on the realisa-
tions for holes X and Y. For these fixed values, the program violates the specifi-
cation independent of the value for Z, so Z is not in the conflict {X 7→ 1,Y 7→ 3}.
5 Experimental Evaluation and Discussion
Implementation. We evaluate the synthesis framework with a prototype6 using
the SMT-solver Z3 [56], and (an extension of) the model checker Storm [34].
Case studies. We consider the following three case studies:
Dynamic power management (DPM). The goal of this adapted DPM prob-
lem [13] is to trade-off power consumption for performance. We sketch a con-
troller that decides based on the current workload, inspired by [39]. The fixed
environment contains no holes. The goal is to synthesise the guards and updates
to satisfy a specification with properties such as ϕ1: the expected number of lost
requests is below λ, and ϕ2: the expected energy consumption is below κ.
Intrusion describes a network (adapted from [51]), in which the controller tries
to infect a target node via intermediate nodes. A failed attack makes a node
temporarily harder to intrude. We sketched a partial strategy aiming to minimise
the expected time to intrusion. Constraints encode domain specific knowledge.
Grid is based on a classical benchmark for solving partially observable MDPs
(POMDPs) [48]. To solve POMDPs, the task is to find an observation-based
6 https://github.com/moves-rwth/sketching
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strategy, which is undecidable for the properties we consider. Therefore, we re-
sort to finding a deterministic k-state strategy [55] s.t. in expectation, the strat-
egy requires less than λ steps to the target. This task is still hard: finding a
memoryless, observation-based strategy is already NP-hard [29,69]. We create a
family describing all k-state strategies (for some fixed k) for the POMDP. Like
in [47] actions are reflected by parameters, while parameter dependencies ensure
that the strategy is observation-based.
Evaluation.We compare w.r.t. an enumerative approach. That baseline linearly
depends on the number of realisations, and the underlying MCs’ size. We focus
on sketches where all realisations are explored, as relevant for optimal synthesis.
For concise presentation we use Unsat variants of feasibility synthesis, where
methods perform mostly independent of the order of exploring realisations. We
evaluate results for DPM, and summarise further results. All results are obtained
on a Macbook MF839LL/A, within 3 hours and using less than 8 GB RAM.
DPM has 9 holes with 260K realisations, and MCs have 5K (reachable) states
on average, ranging from 2K to 8K states. The performance of CEGIS signifi-
cantly depends on the specification, namely, on the thresholds appearing in the
properties. Fig. 6a shows how the number of iterations (left axis, green circle)
and the runtime in seconds (right axis, blue) changes for varying λ for prop-
erty ϕ1 (stars and crosses are explained later). We obtain a speedup of 100×
over the baseline for λ = 0.7·λ∗, dropping to 23× for λ = 0.95·λ∗, where λ∗
is the minimal probabilty over all realisations. The strong dependency between
performance and “unsatisfiability” is not surprising. The more unsatisfiable, the
smaller the conflicts (as in [33]). Small conflicts have a double beneficial effect.
First, the prototype uses an optimistic verifier searching for minimal conflicts;
small conflicts are found faster than large ones. Second, small conflicts prune
more realisations. A slightly higher number of small conflicts yields a severe de-
crease in iterations. Thus the further the threshold from the optimum, the better
the performance.
Reconsider Fig. 6a, crosses and stars correspond to a variant in which we have
blown up the state space of the underlying MCs by a factor B-UP. Observe that
performance degrades similarly for the baseline and our algorithm, which means
that the speedup w.r.t. the baseline is not considerably affected by the size of the
underlying MCs. This observation holds for various models and specifications.
Varying the sketch tremendously affects performance, cf. Fig. 6b for the per-
formance of variants of the original sketch with some hole substituted. The frame-
work performs significantly better on sketches with holes that lie in local regions
of the MC. Holes relating to states all-over the MC are harder to prune. Finally,
our prototype generally performs better with specifications that have multiple
(conflicting) properties: Some realisations can be effectively pruned by conflicts
w.r.t. property ϕ1, whereas other realisations are easily pruned by conflicts w.r.t.,
e.g., property ϕ2.
Intrusion has 26 holes and 6800K realisations, the underlying MCs have only
500 states on average. We observe an even more significant effect of the prop-
erty thresholds on the performance, as the number of holes is larger (recall the
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Fig. 6. Performance (runtime and iterations) on DPM
optimistic verifier). We obtain a speedup of factor 2200, 250 and 5 over the
baseline, for thresholds 0.7·λ∗, 0.8·λ∗ and 0.9·λ∗, respectively. For 0.7·λ∗, many
conflicts contain only 8 holes. Blowing up the model does not affect the obtained
speedups. Differences among variants are again significant, albeit less extreme.
Grid is structurally different: only 6 holes in 3 commands and 1800 realisations,
but MCs having 100K states on average. Observe that reaching the targets on
expectation below some threshold implies that the goal must almost surely be
reached. The MCs’ topology and the few commands make pruning hard: our
algorithm needs more than 400 iterations. Still, we obtain a 3× speedup for
λ = 0.98·λ∗. Pruning mostly follows from reasoning about realisations that do
not reach the target almost surely. Therefore, the speedup is mostly independent
of the relation between λ and λ∗.
Discussion. Optimistic verifiers search for a minimal CE and thus solve an
NP-hard problem [28, 71]. In particular, we observed a lot of overhead when
the smallest conflict is large, and any small CE that can be cheaply computed
might be better for the performance (much like the computation of unsatisfiable
cores in SMT solvers). Likewise, reusing information about holes from previous
runs might benefit the performance. Improvements in concise sketching, and
exploiting the additional structure, will also improve performance.
Sketching. Families are simpler objects than sketches, but their explicit usage of
states make them inadequate for modelling. Families can be lifted to a (restricted)
sketching class, as in [27]. However, additional features like conflicts significantly
ease the modelling process. Consider intrusion: Without constraints, the num-
ber of realisations grows to 6·1011 realisations. Put differently, the constraint
allows to discard over 99.99% of the realisations up front. Moreover, constraints
can exclude realisations that would yield unsupported programs, e.g, programs
with infinite state spaces. While modelling concise sketches with small underly-
ing MCs, it may be hard to avoid such invalid realisations without the use of
constraints.
Comparison with CEGAR. We also compared with our CEGAR-prototype [27],
which applies an abstraction-refinement loop towards, e.g., feasibility synthesis.
In particular, the abstraction aggregates multiple realisations in a single model
to effectively reason about a set of designs. This approach does not support
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multiple objective specification (as of now), and, more importantly, the algorithm
is conceptually not capable of handling constraints. For DPM with a single
objective, CEGAR-prototype is drastically faster, while on Grid, it is typically
(often significantly) slower. Comparing two prototypes is intricate, but there is
a CEGIS strength and weakness that explains the different characteristics.
Weakness: Upon invocation, the CEGIS verifier gets exactly one realisation,
and is (as of now) unaware of other options for the holes. The verifier constructs
a CE which is valid for all possible extensions (cf. Definition 9), even for ex-
tensions which do not correspond to any realisation. It would be better if we
compute CEs that are (only) valid for all possible realisations. The following
example (exaggerating DPM) illustrates that considering multiple realisations
at once may be helpful: Consider a family with a parametric transition (hole)
from the initial state and specification that requires reaching the failure state
with probability smaller than 0.1. Assume that all 100 options lead to a failure
states with probability 1. CEGIS never prunes this hole as it is relevant for every
realisation. Knowing that all options lead to the failure state, however makes the
hole trivially not relevant. Thus, all corresponding options can be safely pruned.
Strength: The weakness is related to its strength: the verifier works with one
concrete MC. An extreme example (exaggerating Grid) is a sketch with holes
h0, . . . , hm, where hole h0 has options 1, . . . ,m, and option i makes holes hj
j 6= i irrelevant (by the model topology). CEGIS considers a realisation, say
{h0 7→ i, . . . , hi 7→ x, . . .}, that violates the specification. As holes hj with j 6= i
are not relevant, CEGIS finds a conflict {h0 7→ i, hi 7→ x}. Indeed, for every
realisation, it is able to prune all but two holes. However, if the verifier would
consider many realisations for h0, it may (without advanced reasoning) generate
much larger conflicts. Thus, considering a single realisation naturally fixes the
context of the selected options and makes it clearer which holes are not relevant.
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Appendix
A Program-level Counterexamples for CEGIS
This section reports on the relevant steps to instantiate an efficient implementa-
tion of the syntax-guided synthesis framework. First, available implementations
of CE generation are too restricted in the variety of properties they support.
Moreover, the embedding into a CEGIS-loop changes the focus of the CE gener-
ation. We motivate and report on a selection of changes. Finally, when moving
from the analysis of a single model to a family of models, the well-foundedness
criteria need reviewing, which we exemplify for three particularly important cri-
teria.
A.1 Better CEs for CEGIS
Before diving into any changes, we recap the technique of [33] for computing
traditional program-level CEs:
Definition 10 (High-level CEs [33]). Given a program P = (Var, C) and
property ϕ = P≤λ[♦G] s.t. P 6|= ϕ, E ⊆ C is a high-level CE if fixdl(P|E) 6|= ϕ.
We have the following connection between high-level and program-level CEs.
Proposition 3. For safety properties, high-level and program-level CEs coin-
cide.
Each program-level CE is trivially a high-level CE. A high-level CE is a program-
level CE, as any additional command can only be enabled in unreachable or
deadlock states. Otherwise, the program would contain overlapping commands,
violating Def. 9. Recall that assuming only non-overlapping programs is crucial.
Consider adding the command s=0 -> s’=2 to the program in Fig. 5a. The
probability to reach s=3 is now reduced to 0.25 resulting in the extended pro-
gram no longer violating Φ. Unreachable states are irrelevant to any property
and, intuitively speaking, adding transitions to deadlocks cannot decrease the
probability to reach ψ.
The technique in [33] computes minimal high-level CEs (i.e. the smallest set
of commands) violating a given reachability property with an upper bound λ.
The set is not unique in general. It reduces the computation to repeatedly solving
MaxSat instances over two sets of propositional formulae, Ξ and Υ . Ξ encodes a
selection of commands and (via a negation) the MaxSat solver minimises the size
of the command set. Υ encodes required (but not sufficient) constraints on valid
CEs, e.g, it states that a command enabled in the initial state must be selected.
In this way, the MaxSat solver returns a candidate set E of commands. Using
standard procedures it is then checked whether E is sufficient to exceed λ. If so,
E by construction is a minimal CE. Otherwise, Υ is strengthened to exclude E
and (possibly) other candidate sets.
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More properties We provide support for program-level CEs beyond upper
bounds on reachability probabilities. We deem support for liveness properties
essential. Consider a sketch for a controller that moves a robot. A sketch that
includes the option to wait together with the single objective that something bad
may only happen with a small probability might simply never make any progress.
While not doing anything typically induces safety, the synthesised controller is
not useful. Likewise, performance criteria such as expected time to completion
or expected energy consumption are widespread, and typically expressed as ex-
pected rewards.
Liveness properites Proposition 3 is crucial for the correctness of our approach,
but it does not hold for lower bounds (e.g. ϕ = Ps≥λ[♦G]). Suppose E is a
(traditional) CE for P and ϕ. Adding commands may add probability-mass
that reaches the target and thus may yield a program P ′ such that P ′ |= Φ.
However, the statement does hold for lower bounds if there are no deadlocks
reachable in [[P|E ]].
The idea thus is to trap more probability mass than 1 − λ in states B from
which there is no path to the target states ψ. To this end, we first compute a
traditional CE E for reaching B with probability at most 1−λ. Then, we extend
E with commands that ensure that the states in B actually may never reach ψ.
This is always possible by construction of B. The resulting set of commands is a
program-level CE as in Def. 9. These CEs are no longer necessarily the smallest
(in terms of the number of commands) for given P and ϕ.
Example 12. Consider the property ϕ = P>0.6[♦ s=2]. The property is violated
by the program from Fig. 4b. Fig. 5b constitutes a CE since with probability 0.5
the system moves to s=3 that in turn is equipped with a self-loop. Hence, the
probability to ever reach s=2 is guaranteed to be below 0.5. Dropping the com-
mand with guard s=3 is insufficient for this guarantee: an additional command
could add transitions from s=3 and s=1 to s=2 and meet the (lower) bound of
ϕ.
Expected rewards We adapted the ideas of state-level CEs for rewards from [59] to
the program level. Intuitively, in the underlying MC of the program, we replace
the self-loops from the fixdl operation by transitions to a target state. For its
soundness, the method has to assume that for each realisation, the probability
to reach the target is one. Otherwise, the costs are by definition infinite, and the
instance can be rejected. Support for lower bounds on rewards requires additional
assumptions and has not been considered so far.
A changed minimisation objective. The following adaptions allow us to
derive conflicts that are in many situations smaller than the conflicts derived
from the minimal CEs described above. Smaller conflicts lead to more effective
pruning and thus improve the performance of the framework. The conflicts we
obtain are always at least as good as before.
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Relevant commands The MaxSat approach in [33] minimises over all commands.
Recall that the design space is given only by relevant commands, i.e. the com-
mands containing holes. Therefore, we change Ξ to minimise the number of
relevant commands. All other commands can be added to a CE without neg-
atively affecting the sizes of the generated conflicts. This significantly reduces
the number of candidates considered during the CE generation. Formula Υ still
reasons about all commands, which allows to restrict the candidate command
sets further.
Example 13. In Fig. 4a only the commands with guards s=0 and s=1 are relevant.
Instead of considering up to 24 candidate command sets (all four commands),
we only consider up to 22 CEs (the two relevant commands).
Multiple CEs CEs (even with minimal size) are not unique. For the same reali-
sation, multiple CEs may lead to different conflicts. Each of them can be used to
prune future realisations from being explored. Furthermore, our approach does
not require to use only the smallest CE, we may want to explore other CEs
beyond the first one. However, minimality is crucial: If a strict subset of a CE E
is already a CE, conflicts generated by E do not prune the design space further.
We thus extend the MaxSat loop to prevents all supersets of E being checked:
If we find a CE E, we extend Υ by blocking all CEs which include the set of
relevant commands in E.
CEs to multiple properties We search for CEs that violate any of the properties.
Candidate CEs that subsume other CEs (potentially for other properties) are
superfluous and should not be considered. We integrated support for CE genera-
tion for multiple properties with the same path formula. For other combinations,
a naive combination induces a severe performance hit to the MaxSat solver, and
proper support is left as future work.
A.2 Handling ill-formed realisations.
Model checkers typically make some assumptions on the well-foundedness of the
input, and might or might not enforce them. Relevant examples for non well-
founded models are the existence of deadlocks in the model, variables that go
out of their bounds, and –in this context– guards that overlap. In the presence
of a sketch, these well-foundedness criteria are easily violated and thus rigorous
handling is essential. We argue that it is not good to simply throw an error if
the well-foundedness is violated by any realisation: Such rigour makes sketching
overly complicated, and might require manually adding various constraints. Con-
versely, checking the well-foundedness of every candidate realisation on side of
the verifier can significantly degrade the performance as by default only single
realisations can be removed from the design space. Below we review how we
handle ill-formed realisations to achieve a good trade-off between the usability
and performance of the synthesis framework.
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Out-of-bounds Variable bounds should be strictly respected. However, constrain-
ing the sketch to prevent generation of realisations with out-of-bounds violations
might be very complex. Therefore, we extend the model checker to add a state
which reflects a variable being out-of-bounds by checking the variable values dur-
ing the MC construction. Then, the properties are extended with a statement
that no probability mass should reach these states. This extension allows us
to apply conflict analysis and typically prune a set of realisations violating the
variable bounds using a single verification query.
Overlapping guards As already pointed out, overlapping guards can prevent effec-
tive CE generalisation. Therefore, we reject realisations with overlapping guards.
In order mitigate the performance degradation caused by returning trivial con-
flicts, we implement a similar extension as for out-of-bounds.
Deadlocks The existence of deadlocks prevents verification of time unbounded
properties, therefore most verification tools automatically apply a fixdl operation.
While this operation is sensible for a single program, it is not for sketches with
holes in guards, as deadlocks are problematic for CE generalisation in combina-
tion with lower-bounded properties. Thus, we treat them analogous to out-of-
bounds and overlapping guards.
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